We discuss aspects of secure quantum communication by proposing and analyzing a quantum analog of the Vernam cipher (one-time-pad). The quantum Vernam cipher uses entanglement as the key to encrypt quantum information sent through an insecure quantum channel. First, in sharp contrast with the classical Vernam cipher, the quantum key can be recycled securely. We show that key recycling is intrinsic to the quantum cipher-text, rather than using entanglement as the key. Second, the scheme detects and corrects for arbitrary transmission errors, and it does so using only local operations and classical communication (LOCC) between the sender and the receiver. The application to quantum message authentication is discussed. Quantum secret sharing schemes with similar properties are characterized. We also discuss two general issues, the relation between secret communication and secret sharing, the classification of secure communication protocols.
Introduction
Recent developments in quantum information theory have brought many surprises in cryptology. A partial list includes an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring 1 which can break the condition for security in many cryptographic protocols, unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocols 2, 3, 4, 5 , and a no-go theorem for unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment 6, 7 . Cryptographic protocols for quantum information are also being developed. For examples, see Refs. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Emerging from these interesting results are important open questions on what quantum mechanics admits and prohibits in cryptography and the reasons why. This paper reports partial progress along this direction, by analyzing a proposed "quantum Vernam cipher" which encrypts a quantum plain-text to a quantum cipher-text using entanglement as a "key". The proposed scheme is a quantum analog of various existing schemes, including the classical Vernam cipher 14 (one-time-pad) in which all of the plain-text, the cipher-text, and the key are classical, the eavesdrop-detecting channel 15 , in which the plain-text and the key are classical but the cipher-text is quantum, and the private quantum channel 8, 9 in which the plain-text and the cipher-text are quantum but the key is classical.
One intriguing property of the quantum Vernam cipher is that the key can be recycled 1 securely using test and purification procedures for entanglement 5, 16 . a As a comparison, key recycling is insecure in the classical Vernam cipher 19 but secure in the eavesdropdetecting channel 15 . These observations suggest that the security of key recycling comes from the possibility to detect eavesdropping in the quantum cipher-text, rather than using entanglement as a key. We give further support to this suggestion by modifying the private quantum channel to securely recycle the classical key.
Another intriguing property of the quantum Vernam cipher is the ability to correct for any damage on the transmitted quantum state. Moreover, the correction procedure involves only classical communication between the sender and the receiver. These can be explained by the theory of quantum secret sharing 10, 11 . Quantum secret sharing schemes with similar properties are characterized. We discuss general connections between secret communication and secret sharing, and apply the connections to other secret communication schemes.
As suggested by the above results, and in concert with our effort to relate cryptographic properties to various elements in cryptographic schemes, we classify existing schemes according to the classical or quantum nature of the communication channel and the key (the resources) and the plain-text (the application), and consider the security of key recycling and reliability for each class. Besides the schemes mentioned above, teleportation 20 , superdense coding 21 , and key distribution protocols 2,3 are also included.
Secure key recycling and reliability are closely related to message authentication. We briefly discuss applications of our analysis to the authentication of quantum messages 12, 13 .
Despite the fact that entanglement is recycled in the quantum Vernam cipher, we find that, given the same resources, secure quantum communication can be more efficiently realized by distributing entanglement and then teleporting the state. We emphasize that our main goal is to understand and analyze security in quantum protocols; our proposed cipher and the comparisons with other schemes are tools for doing so. This paper is structured as follows. The quantum Vernam cipher is described in Section 2 following the reviews of private key encryption and the private quantum channel. Eavesdropping and error correction strategies are explained in Section 3. Key recycling is analyzed in Section 4. The connections between secret communication and secret sharing are discussed in Section 5. We conclude with a classification of secure communication protocols, some applications of the analysis to authentication, and some open questions. For completeness, various relevant cryptographic schemes are described in Appendices A, C, and D.
Definitions and Assumptions
In communication problems, the sender, the receiver, and any adversary (such as an eavesdropper) are traditionally called Alice, Bob, and Eve respectively. For simplicity in a A recent article 17 has independently reported using entanglement as a recyclable quantum key to conceal classical information. The application to encrypt quantum information was suggested but not accomplished 18 . notation and in the proofs, we make the following assumptions throughout the paper.
• Channel noise and logical errors are negligible.
• Alice and Bob have a 2-way classical broadcast channel. Hence classical communication is public but unjammable and authenticated (not forged or tampered with). • Alice and Bob may also be given a quantum channel or entanglement. Such quantum channel is assumed insecure, while the given entanglement is pure and authenticated.
The two quantum resources are inequivalent. Entanglement can be converted to a secure quantum channel by teleportation (see Appendix A). A quantum channel which is insecure can establish "mixed entanglement", but further test and distillation procedures 16, 5 are needed to establish pure entanglement.
Concealing Ciphers
In this section, we describe the quantum Vernam cipher. We first review basic notions in private key encryption, using the classical Vernam cipher, the eavesdrop-detecting channel, and the private quantum channel as examples. These examples also motivate the construction of the quantum Vernam cipher. We concentrate on the ability to conceal the communicated secret from an eavesdropping adversary. Other aspects of security will be discussed later.
Private key encryption
In secret classical communication using private key encryption, Alice and Bob share a secret string K, called the "key", which encrypts (locks) a message M from Eve during transmission and decrypts (opens) M for Bob afterwards.
For example, in the Vernam cipher 14 , a random n-bit key K is used to encrypt an n-bit message M (also known as the plain-text). Alice sends a cipher-text C = M ⊕ K to Bob, where ⊕ denotes bitwise xor (addition modulo 2). Bob decodes by calculating C ⊕ K = M . Shannon proved that 19 the Vernam cipher is absolutely secure: b C is random and independent of M when K is random and unknown. Shannon also proved that absolute security requires the entropy (thus the length) of K to be at least n. Thus reusing a key, even with privacy amplification 22 , compromises security when previously transmitted cipher-text might have been tapped.
As another example, we consider a simple case of the eavesdrop-detecting channel 15 . Let r be a security parameter. An n-bit classical plain-text M is encrypted with two (n+r)-bit classical keys K 1 , K 2 into a quantum cipher-text as follows. Alice concatenates M with r random subset parities of M to form M ′ . She sends each bit of K 1 ⊕ M ′ in the basis {|0 , |1 } or {|+ , |− } depending on each bit of K 2 . After Bob receives and decodes the cipher-text, Alice announces the random subsets. The decoded message is accepted only if all the subset parities are correct. In this case, the keys can be reused b A cipher is absolutely secure if C and M are independent.
(with privacy amplification), because, when l bits of the cipher-text have been intercepted, the probability to have no inconsistencies in the subset parities is no more than ( 3 4 ) −l .
Private quantum channel
We motivate the quantum Vernam cipher by reviewing the following canonical example of the private quantum channel 8, 9 , which uses a classical key to encrypt a quantum plaintext to a quantum cipher text. For simplicity, we call the canonical example the private quantum channel. Let
denote the 2 × 2 identity and three "Pauli matrices". To send one quantum bit (qubit) given by the density matrix ρ, Alice and Bob share a 2-bit key K = (k 1 , k 2 ). Alice applies Z k2 X k1 to ρ and sends to Bob the resulting "cipher-text" ρ ′ = Z k2 X k1 ρX k1 Z k2 , which is decoded by Bob by applying X k1 Z k2 . From Eve's point of view, Alice is sending ρ, XρX, ZρZ, and ZXρXZ at random; she sees a mixture I 2 which is independent of ρ. To send an n-qubit state ρ, the 1-qubit scheme is applied bitwise. Let K be a 2n-bit classical key with i-th bit k i . Let X i and Z i denote X and Z acting on the i-th qubit. Alice sends to
. Bob applies U † K to recover ρ from ρ ′ . Eve sees a mixture of uniformly distributed possible states:
which is independent of ρ. c It was also proved in Ref. 8 that H(K) ≥ 2n is necessary to completely randomize an arbitrary ρ. A schematic diagram is given in Fig. 1 . 
The quantum Vernam cipher
We use entanglement as the key in our quantum Vernam cipher. The fundamental unit of entanglement is an "ebit". Alice and Bob are said to share an ebit if each possesses one qubit of a known maximally entangled state of two qubits, such as the EPR states
The procedure to transmit one qubit using two ebits is summarized in Fig. 2 . The registers in Fig. 2 are labeled by a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 , and m. {a 1 , b 1 } and {a 2 , b 2 } are initially in the state |Φ + . The registers a 1 , a 2 belong to Alice and b 1 , b 2 belong to Bob all the time. The register m initially carries the message ρ and belongs to Alice. Alice applies a controlled-X (cnot) from a 1 to m and a controlled-Z (cz) from a 2 to m and sends m to Bob. We assume Eve takes control of m during the transmission. When Bob receives m, he applies a cz from b 2 to m, followed by a cnot from b 1 to m to recover ρ. To send an n-qubit state ρ, the one-qubit protocol is applied bitwise. We show that the quantum Vernam cipher is a purification of the private quantum channel, superposing all possible key states: The key registers (a 1 , b 1 , · · · , a 2n , b 2n ) have initial state |Φ + ⊗2n . Reordering the qubits as (a 1 , · · · , a 2n , b 1 , · · · , b 2n ), the initial key state 1 2 n K |K |K , where K ranges over all 2n-bit strings, is indeed the superposition of all possible classical keys. Finally, the quantum Vernam cipher and the private quantum channel have equivalent encoding and decoding operations, establishing the claim. Eve sees a cipher-text described by tracing out the subsystem {a 1 , · · · , a 2n , b 1 , · · · , b 2n }, which corresponds to averaging over all possible keys |K |K . Following the discussion in Section 2.2, Eve sees the state I ⊗n /2 n . Thus Eve obtains no information on ρ.
In the absence of eavesdropping, the circuit in Fig. 2 acts trivially, so that ρ is recovered, and the key |Φ + ⊗2n is regenerated. We now consider the effects of eavesdropping.
Eavesdropping and Error Correction
Even though Eve obtains no information from the cipher-text, she may disturb, destroy, or alter it, and entangle her ancilla with the quantum key to be regenerated. In this section, we describe the effects of eavesdropping and a basic correction method, which are starting points for our discussions in Sections 4 and 5.
General eavesdropping and correction strategy
We assume that the plain-text is initially disentangled from Eve. Eve's most general strategy is to apply a joint unitary operation U on the transmitted cipher-text and a pure state ancilla of hers, and send Bob "something". We may assume she outputs the correct number of qubits as Bob can add or discard qubits. Note that there is no further communication from Eve to Alice or Bob. Thus subsequent action F by Eve on her ancilla cannot change the superoperator E that describes the transmission of the cipher-text. The situation is summarized as Í A convenient representation of E is given by 23, 24 
where e ij are entries of a positive matrix and the sum is over all Pauli matrices P i on the n-qubit cipher-text. Equation (3) can be interpreted as a process that transforms a state ρ into a mixture k D k ρD † k where D k are noninterfering errors. Expressing each D k as a linear combination of Pauli matrices, one obtains Eq. (3). The P i in Eq. (3) thus represent errors that may interfere with each other. Using the language of quantum error correction, we call the P i Pauli errors. We now show that if Alice and Bob determine with high probability what Pauli error has occurred, their final state is almost disentangled from Eve. The process of determining the error is called syndrome extraction.
The cipher-text is generally part of a stateρ obtained from encoding the plain-text with some ancilla. The state possessed by Alice and Bob after the transmission is given by
where the identity operator I acts on the uncommunicated subsystem.
First suppose it is possible to perfectly distinguish the states (
Sinceρ is positive, Eqs. (5) and (6) are equivalent to
The projector Q i removes any term in Eq. (4) with a P j for all j = i, leaving only the output (I ⊗ P i )ρ(I ⊗ P † i ), which is independent of E and disentangled from Eve. We consider situations deviating from the above perfect scenario. For example, the measurement outcome i may be accompanied by some irreversible state change O i . Moreover, the measurement may only distinguish subsets of errors or be probabilistic, so that multiple terms in Eq. (4) may remain in the final state. However, if a syndrome i is extracted with high probability, the post-measurement state has density matrix dominated
and is almost disentangled from Eve. Suppose Alice and Bob reuse a private key obtained from (I ⊗ E)(ρ) which is entangled with Eve. Eve can learn about the future communication or correlate different rounds of communicated materials only through the correlation with the reused private key. Such correlation is small when syndrome extraction succeeds with high probability, in which case Eve has little information on any nontrivial function on all the plain-text. Key recycling is then semantically secure 25 . A scheme is semantically secure 25 , if there is vanishing difference between the probabilities to estimate the value of any nontrivial function on the plain-text, with or without the cipher-text.
Error correction for the quantum Vernam cipher
Recall that it suffices to identify the Pauli error that occurs in the cipher-text. We show how this can be done perfectly in the quantum Vernam cipher. We use the fact that Fig. 2 acts trivially, and the commutation relations
to find the effect of errors on the cipher-text for the one-qubit protocol: We emphasize that this detection procedure effectively turns Eve's most general action into a Pauli error. An example to recover the message without the cipher-text is given in Appendix B.
Key Recycling
We have seen that the EPR pairs in the quantum Vernam cipher can be measured to extract the exact error syndrome. We now show that, when many qubits are sent, it is possible to use less entanglement (per qubit) for syndrome extraction with very high probability. The remaining EPR pairs can be recycled, with semantic security. We show strong evidence that security is due to transmitting a quantum cipher-text, rather than using entanglement as the key, by modifying the private quantum channel to recycle a classical key.
Recycling quantum key
Recall that after sending n qubits with the quantum Vernam cipher, Alice and Bob share 2n EPR pairs either in |Φ + or |Φ − , in a one-to-one correspondence with the Pauli error in the cipher-text. Syndrome extraction is equivalent to learning the identity of these EPR pairs. Asymptotically, this can be done in two steps. The first step, adapted from Ref. 5 , is a preliminary test for eavesdropping by testing if the EPR pairs are |Φ ⊗2n . Without indication of eavesdropping, the decoded state is accepted, and the EPR pairs are recycled. Otherwise, a second step is performed to find the identity of the EPR pairs by a random hashing method adapted from Ref. 16 . This procedure applies to the most general eavesdropping strategy.
Let the identity of the 2n EPR pairs be represented by a 2n-bit string v, with 0 and 1 corresponding to |Φ + and |Φ − . d We first describe a useful protocol to obtain the parity of a subset of bits in v. The "bilateral xor" (bxor), defined as cnot a1a2 ×cnot b1b2 , e effects the transformation:
where the qubits are ordered as a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 . The control pair (a 1 , b 1 ) becomes the parity of the two pairs. Likewise, the parity of a subset {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , · · ·} can be found by applying bxor from an extra |Φ + to all of {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , · · ·}. For the preliminary test for eavesdropping, let r be a security parameter. Alice and Bob pick r random subsets of v and find their parities using r extra |Φ + . f If v = 0, all subsets have even parities. Otherwise, each random subset has equal probability to be odd or even, and the probability of obtaining only even parities is 2 −r .
If all r parities are even, Alice and Bob recycle the 2n-ebit key. The probability for Alice and Bob to miss an error in the decoded message and recycle a compromised key is Prob(pass and erroneous) ≤ Prob(pass|erroneous) = 1 2 r which can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently large r.
If some subset has odd parity, Alice and Bob determine v as follows. The distribution of v is generally unknown. However, Alice and Bob can estimate the Hamming weight g of v by sampling r 2 random bits of v. How r 2 depends on the security level can be found as follows. If the Hamming weight of v is αn, andαr 2 1's are sampled, Chebyshev's inequality implies ∀δ > 0 Prob(|α − α| ≥ δ) < 1 4δ 2 r2 . h Hence ∀ǫ > 0, choosing r 2 > 1 4δ 2 ǫ guarantees Prob(α ∈ (α − δ,α + δ)) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Thus with probability larger than 1 − ǫ, v ∈ T the typical set of a binomial distribution with biasα and with size no greater than 2 2nH(α+δ) . Here, H denotes the binary entropy function 26 and for simplicityα + δ < 1 2 . As each random subset parity eliminates about half of the possible values of v, v can be identified with r 3 ≈ 2nH(α + δ) random subset parities. Approximately 2n(1 − H(α + δ)) EPR pairs can be recycled with vanishing correlation with Eve.
Note that the preliminary test uses r ebits, and the second step uses r 2 + r 3 ebits. Since r and r 2 are independent of n, they are negligible for asymptotically large n. In contrast, r 3 ∝ n. This is the reason for splitting the procedure into two steps. Finally, we use classical probabilities throughout the discussion since measurements are only made in the |Φ ± basis 5 .
d This representation is a simplified version of that in Ref. 16 . e The first and second subscripts denote the control and target bits. f These extra |Φ + are unnecessary but they simplify the procedure. g The Hamming weight is the number of "1" in a bit-string. h The test bits are identically distributed, and negatively correlated, so that Chebyshev's inequality applies.
Recycling classical key
To illustrate that secure recycling is not a property special to entanglement, we adapt a scheme in Ref. 15 to recycle the classical key in the private quantum channel. The main idea is to add known test qubits to detect errors effectively. Specifically, consider sending n qubits with security parameter r. Alice encodes the n qubits with a 2n-bit classical key as in the original scheme described in Section 2.2. She appends to the data qubits 2r test qubits, called x 1 , · · · , x r , z 1 , · · · , z r , in the state |0 ⊗r |+ ⊗r . Each test bit may be flipped |0 → |1 , |+ → |− depending on a 2r-bit classical key. In addition, she picks 2r random subsets S x1 , · · · , S xr , S z1 , · · · , S zr of the n data qubits. For each i, a cnot is applied from each qubit in S xi to x i . Likewise, a cnot is applied from z i to each qubit in S zi . Alice also picks r random subsets T x1 , · · · , T xr of {z 1 , · · · , z r } and applies a cnot from each z j ∈ T xi to x i . i Then, she sends all n + 2r qubits to Bob. After Bob announces a receipt of all the qubits, Alice announces all 3r subsets. Bob decodes by inverting Alice's operation. If the test qubits are in the state |0 ⊗n |+ ⊗n , he accepts the decoded data qubits and recycles the classical key. The main idea behind the modification is illustrated in Fig. 3 . i Note that T x1 , · · · , Txr also define r random subsets T z1 , · · · , Tzr of x 1 , · · · , xr such that a cnot is applied from z j to each x i ∈ T zi .
If no error occurs to the (n+2r)-qubit cipher-text during transmission, the test qubits are always decoded as |0 ⊗r |+ ⊗r . However, if a nontrivial Pauli error occurs, the test qubits are decoded as |0 ⊗r |+ ⊗r with probability no higher than 2 −r . To see this, decompose the Pauli error into its X and Z components, and without loss of generality, the X component is nontrivial. The overall effect of the extra cnot can be found using the commutation relations in Section 3.2. An X j during transmission becomes X j and an extra X xi on the original cipher-text if j ∈ S xi . Likewise, X zj becomes X zj with an extra X xi if z j ∈ T xi . An X xi decodes to itself. Thus x i has an overall X error if an odd number of X occurs to S xi ∪ T xi ∪ x i . As any nontrivial tensor product of X errors is equally likely to act on an even or odd number of qubits in a random subset, the probability for x 1 , · · ·, x r to decode to |0 ⊗r is 2 −r . A Z error is propagated to the z i similarly. Note that the X and Z components act independently on the test qubits, and the x i are unaffected by Z errors and the z i are unaffected by X errors. This completes the proof that any nontrivial Pauli error is undetected with probability no more that 2 −r .
We now generalize the analysis for Pauli errors to the most general eavesdropping strategy. Using the framework of Section 3.1, let the received cipher-text be E(ρ) = ij e ij P i ρP † j . Let P 0 be the identity Pauli error. Any nontrivial eavesdropping operation has e 00 < 1.
Each set of random subsets corresponds to a detection scheme that distinguishes a set of Pauli errors P I from its complement, and P 0 ∈ P I . The accepted output is E a (ρ) ∝ Pi,Pj ∈PI e ij P i ρP † j . Averaged over the random subsets, the unnormalized accepted state is given by
where c ij ≤ 2 −r except for c 00 = 1. E a (ρ) has high fidelity with respect to the original cipher-text.
For any eavesdropping strategy, the probability of Eve being undetected is at most p E = e 00 + (1 − e 00 )2 −r . We can relate e 00 to the information gained by Eve. Without loss of generality, the cipher-text and Eve's ancilla are initially in a pure product state. After eavesdropping, the joint state remains pure. The classical information gained by Eve is bounded by the entropy of her reduced density matrix, which equals the entropy of E(ρ) = ij e ij P i ρP † j for a pure ρ. E(ρ) has an eigenvalue that is greater than e 00 , hence the entropy is upper bounded by
Eve's probability of eavesdropping without detection is roughly the same as the fraction of the classical information inaccessible to her.
The Quantum Vernam Cipher and Secret Sharing
We now explain the properties of the quantum Vernam cipher in terms of general connections 27 between secret communication and secret sharing 10, 11 . A (classical or quantum) secret sharing scheme divides a secret into shares. The secret is retrievable only with enough shares, which form the authorized sets. Other sets are unauthorized. In general, unauthorized sets can have partial information. We restrict to perfect schemes in which unauthorized sets have no information. A (k, n) threshold scheme is a perfect scheme in which any k out of n shares form an authorized set. In addition to the usual properties, quantum secret sharing schemes also obey the no-cloning theorem 28 , so that complements of authorized sets are unauthorized. Finally, in pure state perfect quantum secret sharing schemes, complements of unauthorized sets are authorized.
Any private key encryption scheme (classical or quantum) which conveys a message from Alice to Bob but conceals it from Eve is a secret sharing scheme. The secret is divided into three shares: A and B are private shares for Alice and Bob, and E is the share communicated from Alice to Bob. Thus A and B represent the key, and E represents the cipher-text. By definition, {A, E} and {B, E} are authorized while B and E are unauthorized. In a quantum cipher, A is unauthorized. If additionally, the scheme is pure, {A, B} is authorized: the scheme is a (2, 3) threshold scheme.
The quantum Vernam cipher is an example of pure state threshold scheme described above. Entanglement is regenerated because A and B are identical shares. Errors on E are correctable because {A, B} is authorized. Furthermore, in the quantum Vernam cipher: (1) Alice can encode an unknown message and her half of the key into the correctly distributed shares all by herself, and (2) errors on E are correctable using only local quantum operations and classical communication (LOCC) between Alice and Bob. We now characterize secret sharing schemes with these two properties. Property (1) holds for all pure state quantum secret sharing schemes in which the reduced density matrix of B is maximally mixed. This follows from the proof of the impossibility of quantum bit commitment 7 , that two pure states with the same reduced density matrix in Bob's system can be transformed to each other by unitary operations acting outside Bob's system. Property (2) holds asymptotically if the entanglement between A and B (in ebits) in the secret sharing scheme is at least twice the size of E (in qubits). This follows from comparing the number of errors to be distinguished with the amount of information obtainable in the random hashing method 16 .
As an example to construct a cipher from a secret sharing scheme with the above characterization, consider the (2,3) threshold scheme obtained from the 5-qubit 1-error correcting code 16, 29 , by assigning two qubits to each of A and B, and one qubit to E. The encoding circuit U enc can be specified by how the stabilizer and the encoded operations evolve 30 . As U enc is in the Clifford group 30 , a circuit implementing U enc can be constructed using a scheme in Ref. 30 . The decoding circuit can be constructed similarly. The cipher obtained is shown in Fig. 4 .
We find from Fig. 4 that the four possible Pauli errors in the cipher-text correlate with the EPR pairs being |Φ + ⊗2 , |Φ − ⊗2 , |Ψ + ⊗2 , and |Ψ − ⊗2 , where |Ψ ± = 1 √ 2 (|01 ± |10 ). The four cases are distinguishable by LOCC. Errors on E cannot be corrected with LOCC, unless extra entanglement is available to Alice and Bob. On the other hand, this cipher requires less entanglement to conceal the message.
We can apply the connections between secret sharing and secret communication to the private quantum channel and teleportation 20 (see also Appendix D) which encrypts a quantum plain-text to a classical cipher-text using a quantum key. j In teleportation, after Alice's measurements, E is the outcome (k 1 , k 2 ) to be communicated and B is the quantum state Z k2 X k1 |ψ possessed by Bob. In the private quantum channel, A = B = (k 1 , k 2 ) is the classical key, and E = Z k2 X k1 |ψ is the communicated quantum state. k Viewing A and B in the second scheme as one share, both schemes are the same (2, 2) threshold scheme with the quantum and classical shares interchanged. As a mixed state (2, 2) scheme, errors on one share is not correctable, as we have seen in the private quantum channel. However, in teleportation, the classical share is broadcast and no correction is needed. Finally, the quantum Vernam cipher, with the three shares forming the state 1 2 k1k2 |k 1 k 2 |k 1 k 2 Z k2 X k1 |ψ is just the purification of the (2, 2) scheme.
Conclusion
We have analyzed two important properties of the quantum Vernam cipher, the security of recycling keys and the reliability of the transmission, and have made comparisons with other related schemes. These results are summarized and extended to other existing schemes in the following table 34 , which is explained next.
j Teleportation paradoxically communicates quantum states securely without quantum communication.
The closely related remote state preparation 32, 33 may not be secure. k This provides an alternative proof for the lower bound of the classical key size, since an important classical share is at least twice the size of the quantum secret 11, 27 . In the table, the type of cryptographic protocol is specified by three elements: the communication channel (which is of the same type as the cipher-text C), the key K, and the message M to be conveyed. A 3-alphabet string represents these three elements in order. Q, C, and 0 respectively stand for the element being quantum, classical, and nonexisting. The first property in question is the security of key recycling and the second property is reliability -whether the correct message is received with high probability. The security properties are based on Alice and Bob having an unjammable 2-way classical broadcast channel.
We can extrapolate the properties of the specific examples to classes of ciphers. For example, due to the use of an unjammable classical broadcast channel, all ciphers of the type C−− are reliable. In contrast, ciphers of the type Q−− are susceptible to errors, unless a large quantum key is available, such as in the quantum Vernam cipher. Since in the worst case the quantum channel is jammed, a general recovery procedure would involve LOCC and is effectively of the type CQQ (though the exact protocol needs not be teleportation). The very same unjammable classical channel in C−− cannot detect for eavesdropping, and used key can be compromised. The susceptibility in the quantum channel in Q−− is also the reason why it can detect eavesdropping and reject compromised keys. This quantum feature also allows key distribution to be possible.
The secure properties of the quantum Vernam cipher come at a price -it requires a quantum channel and pre-shared entanglement. In fact, for the same resources, one can use the quantum channel to establish entanglement and use the entanglement to teleport the state. The two methods are compared in Appendix E. We are not aware of a circumstance in which QQQ is more efficient than the hybrid method Q0Q + CQQ. This is not surprising in view of the above discussion, since the hybrid method exploits the advantages of both types of ciphers.
We have ensured security in key recycling by detecting errors in the cipher-text. This objective is very similar to that of message authentication -to reject a forged or altered message with high probability. For example, our modification to the private quantum channel described in Section 4.2 can be viewed as an authentication step for the encrypted quantum message. For authentication, all U i in Figure 3 can be omitted. The test qubits can detect both forging and tampering with high probability due to the random flip based on the 2r-bit classical key. Forging succeeds with probability no better than 2 −r and the fidelity of an accepted message with respect to the origin cipher-text is of order 1 − O(2 −r ). This means that authenticating n qubits given an insecure quantum channel and an authenticated 2-way classical channel requires only 2r bits of classical key and an extra 2r qubits of quantum communication. We can also drop the assumption of authenticity in the classical communication given a larger key to classically authenticate the classical messages, for example, using the Wegman-Carter method 35 . l Recently, authentication protocols for quantum message using a classical key but no additional classical communication are proposed 12, 13 .
Returning to the connection with secret sharing, we have seen that in the quantum Vernam cipher, the quantum secret can be unlocked from an authorized set using only LOCC between the parties. Under the same conditions, hardly any information can be obtained in a recently proposed scheme 36 to share a classical secret. It will be interesting to understand the origin of such differences. It might be related to the amount of entanglement shared between the parties in the secret sharing scheme, and further investigation is underway. More generally, secret sharing schemes have mostly been analyzed assuming no or full cooperation between the different parties, and the security under LOCC remains an interesting area to be explored.
DiVincenzo, Hoi-Kwong Lo, and Barbara Terhal for critical comments on the manuscript. them in random basis {|0 , |1 } or {|+ , |− }. They subsequently announce their bases. Only the measurement results obtained in the matching basis are used. A sufficient number of the results are announced and compared to test for eavesdropping. Upon passing the test, privacy amplification 22 is applied to the results not announced to establish classical keys.
• Superdense coding Alice and Bob share one copy of |Φ + . Alice can send 2 classical bits c 1 , c 2 securely to Bob as follows. Alice applies X c1 Z c2 on her half of |Φ + and sends it to Bob. Bob can determine c 1 , c 2 by a Bell measurement on both qubits.
Appendix B. Recovery of Message without the Cipher-text
Without loss of generality, let the message be |ψ = a|0 + b|1 . Ordering the registers as (a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , m), the system has initial state |Φ + |Φ + |ψ . The state changes: describe the encoding (Eq. (B.1) ), the removal of m (Eq. (B.2) ), and the decoding by Bob after he substitutes |0 for m ( Eq. (B.3) ). The ⊕ denotes a mixture of states. The decoded state is rewritten in Eq. (B.4) , to which the syndrome measurement described in Section 3.2 is applicable.
Appendix C. Quantum Secret Sharing Scheme as Secure Quantum Channel
We describe another cipher due to Cleve 31 constructed from a (2, 3) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme. The plain-text |ψ = α|0 + β|1 + γ|2 is a three dimensional state (a qutrit). We define the following gates acting on qutrits: · Ø Ø
where sums and differences are taken modulo 3. The proposed scheme can be represented by the following circuit:
in which the maximally entangled state is 1 √ 3 (|00 + |12 + |21 ), A, B represent the private shares of Alice and Bob, and // represents a transmission from Alice to Bob. The regenerated entangled state is explicitly marked. Encoding is performed locally by Alice. As a (2, 3) threshold scheme, any error in the transmitted qutrit is correctable. However, correction cannot be performed using only LOCC operations by Alice and Bob. To see this, we first rearrange the qutrits in the circuit and redefine the maximally entangled state as 1 
